Dominic Mayers
Published 1998-02-10, updated 2004-09-29Version 5
Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum cryptography are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photons may be lost during the transmission. The initial coding into the channel must be perfect (i.e., exactly as described in the protocol). No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.
Comments: Version 5: This is an improved version of the paper that was published in JACM. Previous version: Revtex 18 pages. An appendix which summarizes the notations was added. As in the previous version, the proof uses the POVM model to prove the security of quantum key distribution against all attacks. The proof assumes a noisy channel and an imperfect measuring apparatus
Journal: JACM, vol 48, no 3, May 2001, p 351-406
Composability in quantum cryptography
Quantum Cryptography without Switching
Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
