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Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Published 2000-03-01, updated 2000-05-12Version 2
We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
Comments: 5 pages, Latex, minor changes to improve clarity and fix typos
Journal: Phys.Rev.Lett.85:441-444,2000
Categories: quant-ph
Tags: journal article
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