Matthias Egg, Michael Esfeld
Published 2014-10-31Version 1
The paper explains in what sense the GRW matter density theory (GRWm) is a primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics and why, thus conceived, the standard objections against the GRW formalism do not apply to GRWm. We consider the different options for conceiving the quantum state in GRWm and argue that dispositionalism is the most attractive one.
Comments: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:quant-ph/0603027 by other authors
A real ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics
Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics
Functional inversion for potentials in quantum mechanics
![QR code for arXiv:1410.8652 [quant-ph]](http://oss.arxitics.com/images/favicon.svg)