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arXiv:1409.1452 [quant-ph]AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Quantum Error Correcting Codes and the Security Proof of the BB84 Protocol

Ramesh Bhandari

Published 2014-08-30Version 1

We describe the popular BB84 protocol and critically examine its security proof as presented by Shor and Preskill. The proof requires the use of quantum error correcting codes called the Calderbank-Shor-Steanne (CSS) quantum codes. These quantum codes are constructed in the quantum domain from two suitable classical linear codes, one used to correct for bit-flip errors and the other for phase-flip errors. Consequently, as a prelude to the security proof, the report reviews the essential properties of linear codes, especially the concept of cosets, before building the quantum codes that are utilized in the proof. The proof considers a security entanglement-based protocol, which is subsequently reduced to a "Prepare and Measure" protocol similar in structure to the BB84 protocol, thus establishing the security of the BB84 protocol. The proof, however, is not without assumptions, which are also enumerated. The treatment throughout is pedagogical, and this report, therefore, serves a useful tutorial for researchers, practitioners, and students, new to the field of quantum information science, in particular, quantum cryptography, as it develops the proof in a systematic manner, starting from the properties of linear codes, and then advancing to the quantum error correcting codes, which are critical to the understanding of the security proof.

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