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arXiv:1405.0761 [physics.soc-ph]AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Emergence of Cooperation in Non-scale-free Networks

Yichao Zhang, M. A. Aziz-Alaoui, Cyrille Bertelle, Shi Zhou, Wenting Wang

Published 2014-05-05Version 1

Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. Previous studies proposed a strategy updating mechanism, which successfully demonstrated that the scale-free network can provide a framework for the emergence of cooperation. Instead, individuals in random graphs and small-world networks do not favor cooperation under this updating rule. However, a recent empirical result shows the heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we propose a strategy updating rule with payoff memory. We observe that the random graphs and small-world networks can provide even better frameworks for cooperation than the scale-free networks in this scenario. Our observations suggest that the degree heterogeneity may be neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for the widespread cooperation in complex networks. Also, the topological structures are not sufficed to determine the level of cooperation in complex networks.

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